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Cluster :  Contributed Paper Track - 30-Revenue Management

Session Information  : Tuesday Oct 21, 16:30 - 18:00

Title:  Revenue Management I
Chair: Opher Baron,MIT, 30 Wadsworth St. E53-356, Cambridge MA 02142, United States, opher.baron@sloan.mit.edu

Abstract Details

Title: Application of Seat Inventory Control to Intercity Passenger Rail
 Presenting Author: Shintaro Terabe,Kochi Univ. of Tech., Dept. of Infra. Sys. Eng., Tosayamada, Kochi 7828502, Japan, terabe.shintaro@kochi-tech.ac.jp
 Co-Author: Masahiko MIZUGUCHI,East Japan Railway Co., Frontier Service Lab., Shibuya-ku Yoyogi, Tokyo To 1518578, Japan, mizuguchi@jr-east.co.jp
 Saratchai ONGPRASERT,Kochi Univ. of Tech., Dept. of Infra. Sys. Eng., Tosayamada, Kochi Ko 7828502, Japan, 076038f@gs.kochi-tech.ac.jp
 
Abstract: We intend to apply revenue management to inter-city railway transportation so as to investigate the optimal allocation of seats for each passenger who has different origin and destination pairs. Passenger demand is derived from conjoint analysis which modelled passenger’s preference on different fare class. Results show that all indices such as load factor, number of rejected call for reservation, and revenue for operating company are improved than that without control.
  
Title: Network Control through Resource Pricing
 Presenting Author: Bobby Ninan,Graduate Student, North Carolina State University, 308 Daniels, 111 Lampe Drive, Raleigh NC 27695, United States, bmninan@ncsu.edu
 Co-Author: Mihail Devetsikiotis,Associate Professor, North Carolina State University, 362 Daniels, 111 Lampe Drive, Raleigh NC 27695, United States, mdevets@ncsu.edu
 
Abstract: We model the network - user interaction as a pricing mediated Stackelberg game. The network sets the market price for bandwidth which the users employ to allocate the resources through a noncooperative game. The distributed version of the user game is then analyzed for a finite buffer scenario. We show the conditions under which the network-user game would be the dual of one another and propose an algorithm for achieving system optimality.
  
Title: Characterizing the Output Process of Token Bucket Admission Controls
 Presenting Author: Opher Baron,MIT, 30 Wadsworth St. E53-356, Cambridge MA 02142, United States, opher.baron@sloan.mit.edu
 Co-Author: Gabriel Bitran,Deputy Dean; Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Professor of Management, MIT, 30 Wadsworth st. Office E52-475, Cambridge MA 02142, United States, gbitran@mit.edu
 
Abstract: The characterization of the output streams from token bucket and token bucket with rate control admission-controls is required for their implementation as pricing schemes. This is identical to the steps of one-or two-sided regulated random walks, which also characterize the steady state behavior of inventory level under loss-sales or backlog models. Combining results from sequential analysis and Brownian motion provides approximations for the probabilistic characterization of these streams.
  
Title: Competitive Dynamic Pricing Model with Multiplicative Demand
 Presenting Author: Soheil Sibdari,Student, Virginia Tech, 223 Durham, Blacksburg VA 24060, United States, ssibdari@vt.edu
 Co-Author: Kyle Lin,Assistant Professor, Virginia Tech, Grado Dept of Industrial and Systems Eng, 250 Durham Hall, Blacksburg VA 24061, United States, kylin@vt.edu
 
Abstract: We develop a competitive dynamic pricing model where two sellers sell their perishable products over a finite time horizon. We use the multinomial logit model to describe the consumer choice behavior. We show the existence of a Nash equilibrium and apply it to a numerical example.